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Introduction 
The aspect of United Nations activity that has 
gained most attention in recent years relates to 
the progressive expansion of the Security 
Council's definition of what constitutes "a threat 
to the peace or breach of the peace"-the 
threshold for action under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter. Yet as striking a 
development, and one that may have greater 
long-term impact, has occurred in the context 
of Chapter VI consent-based operations. While 
difficult experiences in Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia tempered enthusiasm for peace 
enforcement among Member States, the UN 
continued to play a vital role conducting 
multidimensional consent-based operations in 
places as diverse as Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Mozambique and Eastern Slavonia. 
The significance of these latter missions 
relates not only to their relative success, but 
also to their implications for our understanding 
of the permissible scope of external involvement 
in internal affairs. The parties to conflicts-in-
cluding sovereign Governments-by requesting 
the UN to help implement difficult transitions 
from war to peace, in effect invite the UN to 
play a significant role in areas long viewed as 
the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction. In 
monitoring, helping to rebuild and in some cases 
actually undertaking state functions-all with 
the consent of the local actors-the UN is 
placed in a much more complicated relationship 
with the state in question than is the case for 
either traditional peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement. The operations are firmly based on 
consent, but by accepting the UN presence, the 
local actors consent to significant outside 
involvement in their sovereign affairs for the life 
of the peace process. 1 
This development, it shall be argued, was 
both influenced by and has profoundly shaped 
the normative climate in which the operations 
take place. It is in part because our conceptions 
of sovereignty have changed that local actors 
have been more willing (and have come under 
increased pressure) to accept this external 
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involvement. At the same time, UN operations 
conducted to help implement a peace agreement 
are applications and implicit interpretations of 
the relevant norms embodied in the Charter and 
other legal instruments, and as such give 
meaning and precision to them in an evolving 
international climate. 
This chapter traces that evolution by looking 
first at the expanding definition of threats to 
international peace and security employed by the 
Security Council. I will then consider the range 
and depth of activities undertaken by the United 
Nations pursuant to comprehensive peace 
agreements or other authority based on consent. 
The next section examines the meaning of 
consent in these circumstances, followed by a 
discussion of the broader normative context in 
which consent is granted and these operations 
take place. The chapter concludes with some 
observations about the strategic implications of 
this development for the United Nations, noting 
the opportunities, challenges and substantial 
risks it creates. 
"Threats to the peace and breaches of 
the peace" 
Ever since its reaction to Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in \990, the Security Council has been 
employing a progressively more expansive 
interpretation of what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security in relation to 
traditional notions of sovereignty.2 The 
aftermath of the Gulf War itself was a key 
moment in this evolution, when the Security 
Council adopted resolution 687 in order to 
complete the work started by the military action 
to oust Iraq from Kuwait-namely to restore 
international peace and security in the region. 
The Gulf War cease-fire resolution, in addition 
to seeking redress for Iraq's act of aggression, 
also authorized unprecedented measures meant 
to constrain its future behavior, including 
provisions to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and to control its nuclear, chemical, 
biological and long-range missile programmes.' 
Three days after adopting resolution 687, the 
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Security Council declared in resolution 688 the 
flow of refugees caused by Iraq's repression of 
its minority populations to be a threat to 
international peace. Though not expressly 
adopted under Chapter VII, the United States, 
United Kingdom and France established "safe 
havens" and no-fly zones in Northern and 
Southern Iraq based on the resolution, paving 
the way to subsequent humanitarian action more 
explicitly under Chapter VII. A series of 
resolutions assigning a humanitarian role to 
peacekeepers in Bosnia followed shortly 
thereafter, which included authorizations under 
Chapter VII first to use "all necessary means" 
(i.e. force) to protect the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and subsequently to deter 
attacks on safe areas in Sarajevo, Srebrenica 
and four other locations.4 This marked the first 
time Chapter VII was invoked for purely 
humanitarian purposes, although it was in the 
context of conflict that had an obvious 
international dimension once the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia had dissolved. Perhaps a 
more significant step conceptually came in 
Somalia, a purely internal conflict, where 
Chapter VII was invoked initially to help bring 
an end to the famine (UNITAF) and later to 
create a secure environment both for 
humanitarian relief efforts and to disarm the 
warring factions, and more generally to support 
political reconciliation and reconstruction of the 
country (UNOSOM I1). That the relevant 
resolutions on Somalia passed without objection 
(and indeed the African members of the Council 
were the driving force behind them) was due in 
part to the fact that the principle of sovereignty 
was not seen to be at stake-in Somalia, a 
"failed state", there was no sovereign entity to 
override.' Operation Turquoise, the French-led 
intervention in Rwanda, did not set a new 
precedent in terms of pushing the boundaries of 
Chapter VII, because the threat to regional 
peace and security posed by the volatile situation 
in the country was clear. However, it came in 
the aftermath of the genocide and reinforced the 
sense that genocide virtually by definition is a 
"threat to the peace" that would justify action 
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under Chapter VII. 
Perhaps the most significant step in terms of 
lowering the Chapter VII threshold came in 
Haiti, where Chapter VII was invoked to impose 
economic sanctions and authorize the use of 
force by a US-led multinational coalition. 
Conceptually, this went beyond Iraq, former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia and R wanda because Haiti 
was not a failed state, there was a humanitarian 
crisis but not a catastrophe on the scale of the 
others, and the refugee flow, while a political 
problem for the US, was not a serious threat to 
international peace and security. The purpose of 
invoking Chapter VII was quite simply to 
authorize the use of coercive measures to 
restore a democratically-elected President. Then 
in 1997, the Security Council condemned the 
overthrow of an elected government in Sierra 
Leone and imposed sanctions, under Chapter 
VII, on the perpetrators of the coup. Although 
the Council never explicitly authorized the use of 
force to overturn the coup, when ECOWAS 
acted in early 1998, the Council welcomed the 
fact that the rule of the military junta had been 
brought to an end and commended the sub-
regional organization. Following Haiti and Sierra 
Leone, one can reasonably ask whether the 
Security Council has given expression to a 
principle that the international community can 
now legitimately intervene, under Chapter VII, 
to reverse a coup d'etat-at least when the coup 
comes in the aftermath of UN-monitored 
elections. 
Most recently, in Kosovo, the Security 
Council has acted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, albeit in the face of strong claims by 
some members of the Council that the matter is 
internal. The international community turned its 
attention to Kosovo in earnest in March 1998 
when it imposed an arms embargo under 
Chapter VII in response to an upsurge in 
violence in Kosovo. The situation nevertheless 
deteriorated throughout the year, prompting a 
diplomatic effort by Richard Holbrooke that 
resulted in two agreements between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE and NATO 
respectively, which provided for the deployment 
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of two verification missions, one on the ground 
and the other in the air. The Security Council 
endorsed the agreements and demanded under 
Chapter VII that the FRY authorities (as well as 
the Kosovo Albanian leadership) cooperate with 
the verifiers. Wrangling in the Council over the 
language of the resolution-and the right to 
intervene in a sovereign state-resulted in the 
following watered down authorization: "in the 
event of an emergency, action may be needed to 
ensure [the] safety and freedom of movement" 
ofthe verification missions. 
The deployment of the missions, however, 
proved not to be enough to quell the violence. 
The campaign of repression by Yugoslav forces, 
culminating in a bloody massacre of 45 ethnic 
Albanians in Racak in January 1999, was met 
with intensified resistance on the part of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army. In an attempt to repeat 
the success of Dayton, the parties were brought 
together in Rambouillet, France under the co-
chairmanship of the French and British Foreign 
Ministers. A last-ditch effort by US Secretary of 
State Albright induced the Kosovo Albanian side 
to sign the accord, but despite the threat of 
airstrikes, the Yugoslav delegation refused. On 
March 24, NATO launched the promised 
airstrikes, without Security Council 
authorization. A draft resolution condemning 
what the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia labelled 
"NATO aggression" was introduced a few days 
later, but lost by a vote of 12-3. 
Looked at together, this series of decisions 
does signify an evolution in the Security 
Council's conception of permissible intervention 
in internal affairs, but the trend has not been 
linear. The painful experiences of Somalia and 
former Yugoslavia led to a notable reluctance on 
the part of Member States to risk the lives of 
their soldiers unless a compelling national 
interest was at stake (despite the horrific price 
of inaction demonstrated by Rwanda). Even in 
the cases of Haiti, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, the 
willingness to use force was not unequivocal." 
Thus it would be wrong to suggest that 
contemporary practice in the Security Council 
signifies a complete erosion of the concept of 
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sovereignty. Despite the case-by-case evolution 
in its application, the general principle has not 
been rejected and indeed, it could be argued that 
recent practice demonstrates the continuing 
significance of state power and authority. An 
examination of the scope and nature of UN 
Chapter VI operations may well be a more 
fruitful line of inquiry for understanding our 
evolving conceptions of sovereignty. It is to 
those operations that I now turn. 
Multidimensional operations 
Consent-based multidimensional operations are 
typically deployed in two sets of circumstances: 
either to support the implementation of a 
comprehensive peace plan; or to support a 
process of reconciliation and re-establishment of 
effective government in the aftermath of a civil 
crisis.7 In addition to military observers or 
troops, they often include police and civilian 
contingents, and their mandates may range from 
monitoring, to rebuilding and renovating state 
institutions, to assisting in and sometimes 
actually performing state functions. They 
invariably involve aspects of peace-building 
designed to address the root causes of conflicts 
and to prevent their recurrence.' These 
operations, firmly based on consent, are 
characterized by rather striking UN involvement 
in the workings of states in order to bring about 
major political and social transformations. Of 
course the relative successes and failures of the 
operations has varied, but it is noteworthy that 
such involvement-with the consent of the local 
actors-took place at all. Five areas stand out. 
Demilitarization 
The demilitarization functions in which the UN 
has engaged range from disarming and 
demobilizing warring parties, to helping to 
reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian society, 
and on the far end of the spectrum, reforming 
military establishments. Even the seemingly 
straightforward peacekeeping task of voluntary 
disarmament and demobilization has proven to 
be massively difficult, requiring a more 
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proactive role for the UN than simply "monitor-
ing", for the simple reason that rendering itself 
militarily impotent is the most significant step a 
party to a peace agreement can take.' Assisting 
in the reintegration of ex-combatants takes the 
UN even deeper into the internal workings of a 
state as it can affect not only the distribution of 
power but also the distribution of wealth in a 
society. From countries that experience lengthy 
civil wars emerge war economies, where large 
segments of the population earn their livelihood 
from the conflict and indeed may not know any 
other way of life. 10 Their reintegration requires 
training, education and, to an extent, a redistri-
bution of wealth in ways that can seem threat-
ening to the established order." Reforming and 
restructuring military establishments is even 
more disruptive to that order, especially in 
societies where the military has a long history of 
operating in relative freedom from civilian 
control. To succeed, as Berdal and Keen point 
out, "outside efforts to restructure armed forces 
[ ... ] must be supplemented by more intrusive 
and long-term measures to monitor the 
workings of military establishments that have 
emerged from civil wars"." 
Law and order 
The most common "law and order" function 
performed by peace-keepers is to monitor local 
police forces and, if necessary, to train them in 
proper policing techniques. More intrusive are 
efforts to help create an entirely new police 
force, when the existing public security bodies 
are weak or corrupt beyond salvation. And in a 
few cases, UN police contingents have actually 
taken over some of the functions of the local 
police in order to maintain law and order. To a 
very limited extent, this was done in Cambodia, 
where UNTAC had powers of arrest and even 
held a number of people in custody for a limited 
period. It was also attempted in Somalia, where 
as part of the effort to capture General Aideed a 
few people were arrested (by military forces) 
and later released. There was talk in Bosnia of 
arming the International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) and endowing it with powers of arrest, 
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and in the refugee camps in what was then 
Zaire, the UNHCR turned to Zairian military and 
police forces to maintain law and order, aided by 
a number of foreign advisers serving as a 
"liaison support group". 
Police functions of one sort or another are 
now a prominent feature of many UN operations 
with over 3000 officers deployed in ten 
missions, three of which were built around a 
police contingent (Haiti, Bosnia and Eastern 
Slavonia in Croatia). A recent study of the 
phenomenon has suggested that efforts to 
achieve sustainable security in a post-conflict 
societies ought to be geared not only at 
maintaining basic law and order but also "imbu-
ing these structures of public security with an 
ethos of public service and impartiality, and to 
bolster societal mechanisms of accountability"." 
In that vein, the UN has devoted considerable 
effort and resources-through training, techni-
cal assistance and on-the-job supervision-to 
ensure that the civilian police forces it helps 
create understand and adhere to accepted 
policing standards and practices. 
Human rights 
UN human rights functions in the context of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding may include 
monitoring and veri tying on-going abuses; 
investigating past violations and imposing a 
measure of accountability for them; promoting 
institutional reforms to prevent future abuses; 
and prosecuting offenders in national or 
international tribunals." El Salvador marked a 
turning point in this regard, where the first 
agreement reached by the parties was on human 
rights, an issue that not many years before 
would have been resisted strongly on 
sovereignty grounds and likely would have been 
left out of a peace agreement altogether. Instead, 
it served as the wedge that opened the door to 
the much broader political settlement that 
followed. And indeed, the fact that the human 
rights component of the mission (and the 
mechanisms established to ensure accountability 
for past crimes) did not undermine the peace 
process revealed that UN activism in this sphere 
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is not necessarily incompatible with its role as 
honest broker in political negotiations. In fact 
the El Salvador experience illustrates the 
symbiotic relationship between human rights and 
peace: on the one hand, the human rights 
agreement paved the way to the broader political 
settlement that followed; on the other hand, the 
demands of the peace process opened the door 
to deeper human rights accountability than either 
of the parties anticipated or may even have 
desired." It should not be surprising, therefore, 
that most UN peace operations since ONUSAL 
(including in AbkhazialGeorgia, Angola, Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone) have included human 
rights components. 
Electoral assistance and political 
participation 
UN functions here range from providing 
technical assistance; to coordinating national and 
international observers; to promoting electoral 
reform and helping to build institutional 
capacity; to observing, verifying or supervising 
elections; to actually organizing and conducting 
elections as part of a peace process.16 Even the 
seemingly neutral act of observing an election 
has significant implications for the concept of 
sovereignty as it bestows legitimacy on the 
elected government. And indeed the demand for 
UN election-observation exceeds what the 
organization is prepared to supply, precisely 
because many Governments seek the 
international legitimacy the UN can confer. 
The UN's electoral assistance work is part of 
a broader aim to promote and expand political 
participation. As the Secretary-General points 
out in his report on The causes of conflict and 
the promotion of durable peace and sustainable 
development in Africa, "elections must [ ... ] be 
part of a long-term undertaking that will lead to 
a strengthening of national institutions and 
democratic processes"." Thus electoral reform, 
the building of institutional capacity and other 
measures designed to open political space 
feature in many operations. In both El Salvador 
and Mozambique, the UN helped to convert the 
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resistance movements into legitimate political 
parties; it is in the process of doing so in Guate-
mala; and it struggled to do so in Angola. In 
Cambodia, Reginald Austin, electoral chief of 
the mission asked about UNTAC: "Is it a political 
operation seeking a solution to the immediate 
problem of an armed conflict by all means 
possible? Or does it have a wider objective: to 
implant democracy, change values and establish 
a new pattern of governance based on multi-
partyism and free and fair elections." 18 The 
mandate of UNTAC was based on the belief that 
these goals are not mutually exclusive and 
indeed that the promotion of a more open and 
democratic culture was the surest way of 
securing lasting peace in Cambodia. 
Local administration 
In Cambodia, the UN actually had the authority 
to exercise control over critical aspects of local 
administration, namely defense, public security, 
finance, information and foreign affairs. 
Although it struggled to fulfill this "semi-trustee" 
role (mainly because the local administrative 
authorities were very good at not allowing 
themselves to be controlled), it is significant that 
not since the United Nations Temporary Execu-
tive Authority in what is now Irian Jaya had the 
UN tried anything remotely comparable. 
UNTAES, the mission established to oversee the 
peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into 
Croatia, also had important executive responsi-
bilities relating to civil administration, the func-
tioning of public services and the reintegration 
of public institutions under the authority of the 
Transitional Administrator. 
Most UN missions do not have such direct 
control over national and local administrative 
machinery, but they have exercised indirect 
influence through verification, technical 
assistance and advisory functions. Thus in El 
Salvador, ONUSAL personnel engaged in what 
the mission termed "active verification", which 
meant not only investigating cases, but also 
uncovering structural defects in the justice 
system, recommending remedies, assisting low-
level police and court officials in doing their jobs 
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and pressuring high level officials to adopt 
reforms in the entire system. In so doing, it 
effectively made itself a factor in the 
administrative life of the country-a non-
threatening peacebuilding technique that was 
tolerated though not always appreciated by the 
authorities." 
Another technique the UN has sought to use 
to promote good administration is by reaching 
out to civil society. Formal mechanisms 
established in El Salvador (the National 
Commission for the Establishment of Peace) and 
Guatemala (an Assembly of Civil Society and the 
Commission to Follow up on the Implementation 
of the Peace Agreements) were designed to 
facilitate the participation of civil society in the 
respective peace processes. Most UN operations 
engage in education and information campaigns 
to promote public awareness of the goals of the 
peace process, and the Lessons Learned Unit of 
the Department of Peace-keeping Operations has 
spoken of the importance of "indirect peace-
building": "the resurrection of a web of non-
governmental, civic, professional, business and 
other associations"." By engaging civil society, 
the hope is that institutions, habits and attitudes 
will be left behind to carry through on the 
peacebuilding work started by the UN. 
Other key aspects of UN peacekeeping and 
peace building include the repatriation and 
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons 
(one need only look to Bosnia and the Great 
Lakes to see how intimately connected this is to 
the internal political dynamics of post-conflict 
societies) and the coordination of economic 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. As it happens, 
none of the peace agreements the UN has been 
charged with monitoring and helping to 
implement have called for radical economic 
reforms or wealth redistribution, although the El 
Salvador agreements do include a limited land 
transfer programme and the Guatemala 
agreements a somewhat more extensive 
programme of agrarian and socio-economic 
reform.2' However, having learned an important 
lesson from the El Salvador experience, the UN 
has gone to considerable lengths to ensure that 
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structural adjustment and austerity programmes 
do not inhibit implementation of the peace 
accords by diverting scarce resources from 
institution-building and other measures needed 
to consolidate peace." Thus in Guatemala, the 
peacemakers have worked closely with the UN 
system, the Bretton Woods institutions and other 
donors to ensure that their programmes are 
consistent with the peace plan. The United 
Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia 
(UNOL) and the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) consult 
regularly with key partners-including the 
Bretton Woods Institutions-in their peace-
building efforts. And in a broader effort to 
strengthen coordination throughout the UN 
system, the Administrative Committee on 
Coordination (composed of the heads of all 
programmes, funds and agencies) recently 
agreed on the concept of a "strategic frame-
work" for complex crises, designed to bring 
more coherence to the entire range of UN 
activities-political, humanitarian, human rights 
and development. Afghanistan was identified as 
a pilot project and, under the chairmanship of 
the Deputy Secretary-General, a strategy for 
that country has been formulated with the 
involvement of all UN political and operational 
partners. 
All of these activities suggest a rather 
striking relationship between the international 
community and the state in question, well-
summarized by Adam Roberts: 
What is emerging in the post-Cold War era is 
not a formal doctrine of trusteeship but rather a 
modest, tentative and pragmatic international 
involvement in aspects of government in many 
countries, in collaboration with local and 
national authorities and often in connection 
with an on-going United Nations peacekeeping 
operation.13 
Trusteeship is indeed too strong a word to 
describe what the UN has been doing, although 
the Kosovo crisis has prompted talk in media 
and academic circles about establishing an 
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international protectorate there as an interim 
arrangement pending final resolution of the 
region's status. Even in the UN context, how-
ever, it is clear that involvement in human 
rights, the reform of public security bodies, 
elections and other peacebuilding activities, 
indicate a wide role for the Organization in the 
management of social and political transitions 
required for the settlement of internal conflicts." 
It is not enough, in trying to understand the 
implications of this phenomenon for the concept 
of sovereignty, simply to point to the fact that 
the UN was invited to play this role: the meaning 
of "consent" in these circumstances is altogether 
different from consent to a traditional peace-
keeping operation. 
UN operations and sovereign consent 
In multidimensional operations, the UN's role, 
even if technically limited to verification of a 
peace agreement, is necessarily more proactive 
than that term would suggest. Because of the 
complexity of the mandates and multiplicity of 
the local actors involved, the level of 
cooperation can vary throughout the life of the 
peace process.25 Moreover, no matter how 
comprehensive the peace agreements (the 
Guatemala accords run to some 250 pages), 
they cannot possibly provide for every 
contingency or completely define the scope of 
UN involvement. Implemented over an extended 
period, gaps in the accords materialize, 
problems of interpretation arise and 
circumstances change. The original consent 
granted is necessarily open-ended and in part a 
gesture of faith that later problems can be 
worked out on a consensual basis.2• 
Multidimensional operations ultimately are 
designed to transform the political and 
institutional landscape in the societies where 
they are deployed. In the circumstances, the UN 
sometimes finds itself in the awkward position 
of being "more royalist than the king", insisting 
on full compliance more strenuously than the 
parties themselves. It is justified in doing so 
precisely because the transformative nature of 
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comprehensive peace processes means the UN's 
responsibility is to the society as a whole, and 
not only to the immediate signatories of the 
accords.27 
Moreover, granting consent in these 
circumstances is rarely an act of pure volition. 
As Kofi Annan wrote when he was Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
"the decision of the parties to grant consent is 
never taken in a vacuum. It is, rather, a function 
of the alternatives. ,," UN mediation and monitor-
ing will be called for if and when the parties 
believe the only alternative is military stalemate. 
When outside pressure to settle is added to the 
mix, as it was in Dayton, Ohio, then the notion 
of volition becomes even less meaningful. In 
January 1999 the Secretary-General suggested 
that the threat of force was necessary to bring 
about a negotiated settlement in KOSOVO.29 
Indeed, the negotiations in Rambouillet took 
place under the shadow of airstrikes threatened 
against the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanian 
delegation only signed under intense diplomatic 
pressure. Thus if an agreement had been 
reached at the time, it would have been "con-
sent-based" only in the broadest definition of 
that term. Short of the Dayton and Kosovo 
scenarios, more indirect pressure is often 
brought to bear by "contact groups" and "groups 
of friends"-a technique of peacemaking which 
has become so popular that some variation on 
the theme exists in almost every UN peace 
process.JO These groups often remain engaged 
through the implementation and peace building 
phase, exercising leverage either in the form of 
sticks or carrots. Kofi Annan, in distinguishing 
what he calls positive from coercive induce-
ments, identifies two categories of the former: 
"civic action" aimed at gaining the goodwill and 
cooperation of the population; and "peace 
incentives" intended as leverage to further the 
reconciliation process by offering rewards to 
erstwhile antagonists.3I Positive inducements 
can help shape and reinforce consent during a 
peace process and can help ensure that coopera-
tion comes not only from the immediate parties 
to the conflict but from all political actors with a 
11 
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stake in-or capacity to disrupt-a peace 
process. J2 
The fine line between consent and coercion 
in multidimensional operations is illustrated by 
UNTAES. Based on a peace agreement that was 
clear in its objective-the peaceful reintegration 
of the Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium region into Croatia-but short on 
detail, the parties requested the Security Council 
to establish a "transitional administration" to 
govern the region for a 12 month period 
(subsequently extended). The Transitional 
Administrator had authority to impose decisions 
on the parties, backed up by a 5000 strong 
peacekeeping force and the looming presence of 
NATO deployed nearby in Bosnia.33 Thus 
although UNTAES was based on the formal 
consent of the parties, what they consented to 
essentially was to submit to the executive 
authority of the Transitional Administrator for 
the life of the operation. This authority, used 
sparingly but effectively, was critical to 
UNTAES' success. 
Normative developments 
In addition to the internal dynamics of a peace 
process and overt pressure from outside, the 
international normative climate has contributed 
to the apparent willingness of sovereign entities 
to accept such extensive outside involvement in 
their affairs. At the end of World War 11, 
international peace and security was conceived 
largely in terms of the military threat states 
posed to one another. The UN Charter, however, 
contains the seeds of a much broader 
conception of security-that of human security, 
a term the Secretary-General has used often in 
describing the UN's current mission. Established 
primarily to prevent the "scourge of war", the 
UN's objectives also include the promotion of 
human rights, justice and respect for 
international law, as well as "social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom". How 
the UN has gone about fulfilling these multiple 
missions since 1945 has been determined by the 
broader international climate in which it oper-
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ates. The various post-Cold War Chapter VII 
interventions cited above would not have been 
possible had the normative climate not been ripe. 
But that normative climate did not change 
overnight when the Berlin Wall came down. One 
has to trace developments back further to fully 
understand the state of contemporary peace 
operations. 
The United Nations was not conceived as a 
legislative body (although its decisions on 
specific disputes are binding), but as the world's 
only truly universal forum, it has come to play 
an important role in creating, shaping, and 
defining international law. The most obvious 
way in which it has done so is by generating 
multilateral treaties, such as the Law of the Sea 
Convention or the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty, which were negotiated under UN 
auspices. As relevant to this analysis is the 
recommendatory authority of the General 
Assembly, under Article 10 of the Charter. 
General Assembly declarations and resolutions 
have a prescriptive impact either as a reflection 
of custom or by serving as authentic 
interpretations of the Charter or general 
principles of international law-the unanimously 
adopted Declaration on Friendly Relations 
among States (1970) is often cited in making 
this point. As 10nathan Charney states: 
customary law is still created in the traditional 
way. but the process has evolved in recent years 
to a more structured method, especially in the 
case of important normative developments. 
Today, rather than practice and opinio juris, 
multilateral forums often play a central role in 
creating and shaping contemporary 
international law { . .] Today, developments in 
international law often get their start or 
substantive support from proposals, reports, 
resolutions, treaties and protocols debated in 
such forums. That process draws attention to 
rules and helps shape and crystallize them. 34 
Others argue that the weight of this so-called 
"instant custom" has been exaggerated by those 
who are anxious to escape the bounds of sover-
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eign consent in norm-creation and recognition,35 
and indeed a vote for a General Assembly 
resolution should not in itself be understood as 
evidence of an enduring commitment to the 
norm embodied in the resolution." It is signifi-
cant, however, that the International Court of 
Justice in both the Nicaragua case (1986) and 
its Advisory Opinions on the legality of nuclear 
weapons (1996) looked to UN resolutions more 
than state practice and opinio juris to ascertain 
whether relevant law existed. Ultimately, 
whether these resolutions and declarations are 
viewed as "soft" or "hard" law, they form part 
of the normative climate within which peace 
agreements are negotiated and implemented. 
They are evidence of a standard of behaviour 
around which a consensus exists or is emerging 
and as such have an impact on the way the 
international community-including the parties 
to conflicts-reacts to circumstances meant to 
be covered by the norm. 
Perhaps the most dramatic international 
normative development since the founding of the 
UN has been in the field of human rights. The 
adoption of the Genocide Convention and 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in late 
1948 spawned an impressive list of legal 
instruments, including the Geneva Conventions 
on humanitarian law, the Convention on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights/Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the 
Convention Against Torture. These were 
accompanied by important regional 
developments like the adoption ofthe Helsinki 
Final Act (1975), and the Santiago Commitment 
to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-
American System (1991). Within the UN 
system, the struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights, the re-invigoration of the Commission 
on Human Rights, the establishment of two war 
crimes tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugo-
slavia, and the adoption in 1998 of a Statute for 
an International Criminal Court served to pro-
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gressively elevate human rights to near the top 
of the international peace and security agenda. 
(The last is especially important as it means 
that, from the moment the Court is established, 
all peacemaking will take place in its shadow.") 
Meanwhile, the appointment of Mary 
Robinson, a former Head of State, has 
invigorated the human rights activities of the 
Secretariat, and indeed in his proposals for 
reform of the Organization in July 1997, the 
Secretary-General identified human rights as a 
cross-cutting theme that must inform all the 
work ofthe UN." Indeed, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights currently 
conducts field operations in a number of 
countries, and during 1997-98, it carried out 
some 45 technical cooperation projects in over 
25 states, as well as a number of regional and 
global level projects. The UNDP recently 
adopted a policy document on human rights and 
has entered into an agreement with the OHCHR 
to facilitate its efforts to integrate human rights 
concerns in development assistance. UNICEF 
has adopted a rights-centered approach, guided 
in particular by the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
The Secretary-General himself has raised the 
profile of human rights, invoking the theme 
repeatedly and with vigour in his speeches and 
public statements. A significant measure of how 
far the normative climate has evolved is the 
positive reception of the following statement 
made by the Secretary-General at the Summit of 
the Organization of African Unity in 1997: 
I am aware of the fact that some view [the 
concern for human rights] as a luxury of the 
rich countries for which Africa is not ready. I 
know that others treat it as an imposition, if not 
a plot, by the industrialized West. I find these 
thoughts truly demeaning, demeaning of the 
yearningfor human dignity that resides in every 
African heart.[..] So I say this to you, my 
brothers and sisters, that human rights are 
African rights, and I call upon all of you to 
ensure that all Africans are able fully to enjoy 
them." 
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At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 
January 1999, the Secretary-General issued a 
challenge to the international business 
community, calling on firms "to enhance, 
support and enact a set of core values" in the 
areas of human rights, labour standards and 
environmental practices-explicitly chosen 
because they are areas in which fundamental 
values have been enshrined in and defined by 
international agreements.40 It is no longer seen 
as exceptionable, or even exceptional, when 
human rights issues are raised across the range 
of UN activities from peacemaking and peace-
keeping to the Organization's relations with the 
private sector. 
Concern for human rights was the harbinger 
of a more general reconsideration of what may 
threaten domestic and international peace. 
Political participation and democracy have, in 
the view of some analysts, emerged as "rights" 
under international law and have come to be 
seen as fundamental to peace and stability.41 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights provides that every citizen 
shall have the right to take part in the conduct 
of public affairs and to vote in genuine periodic 
elections.42 And in the early 1990s, the General 
Assembly approved guidelines to govern UN 
election-monitoring missions and the 
establishment of a central coordinator for this 
function within the Secretariat, the Electoral 
Assistance Division in the Department of 
Political Affairs." These and other developments 
within the UN system aimed at promoting 
democratization44 came against the backdrop of 
a growing body of academic literature linking 
democratic forms of governance to peace, both 
inter- and intra-state." 
Commenting on the even broader concept of 
good governance, the Secretary-General in his 
1998 Annual Report on the Work of the 
Organization stated "we now recognize more 
clearly than ever the crucial linkages between 
poverty, bad governance and the abuse of 
human rights, on the one hand, and violent 
conflict on the other"·46 Since its inception, 
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UNDP has provided technical assistance 
designed to strengthen the capacity of the state 
and in January 1997, "governance" was specifi-
cally confirmed as one of the UNDP's priorities. 
As part of its governance programmes, the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 
the Secretariat is compiling an inventory of its 
governance projects. The World Bank, in a 
significant development, established a unit in its 
bureaucratic structure to deal with post-conflict 
reconstruction and in its 1997 World Develop-
ment Report, devoted to The State in a Chang-
ing World, enunciated a strategy to: 
raise state capability by reinvigorating public 
institutions. This means designing effective 
rules and restraints, to check arbitrary state 
actions and combat entrenched corruption. It 
means subjecting state institutions to greater 
competition, to increase their efficiency. It 
means increasing the performance of state 
institutions, improving pay and incentives. And 
it means making the state more responsive to 
people ~ needs, bringing government closer to 
the people through broader participation and 
decentralization. " 
This focus on the effectiveness of government 
has been matched by a concern about what the 
Secretary-General has called the forces of 
"uncivil society"-terrorism, drug trafficking 
and transnational crime-the profile of which 
were raised by the recent Special Session of the 
General Assembly to examine the global drug 
problem and related threats. It is now 
conventional wisdom that these problems are 
global and can only be combatted through 
collective action, and the UN Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention is being 
strengthened and re-focussed to meet these 
challenges. 
Developments in the field of disarmament are 
also noteworthy. The indefinite extension of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the adoption 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and 
the steps to strengthen the verification and 
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enforcement provisions of the Biological 
Weapons Convention represent a significant 
acceleration in multilateral control of weapons 
of mass destruction. Ultimate responsibility for 
enforcement of all of these treaties resides with 
the Security Council-a role assigned by the 
treaties themselves. The "taboo" against weap-
ons of mass destruction was reinforced at the 
Security Council summit in January 1992, 
where the Heads of State and Government 
acknowledged that the proliferation of these 
weapons was a threat to international peace and 
security. The action against Iraq and the 
statements of the Security Council on North 
Korea's threat to withdraw from the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty and the nuclear tests 
by India and Pakistan (and disarmament 
generally) suggest that the Security Council is 
taking its commitment at the Summit seriously." 
The normative environment has also been 
affected by two Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice casting doubt on 
the international legality of nuclear weapons. 
The evolution in the field of weapons of 
mass destruction has been matched by some 
dramatic developments in conventional arms 
control. The astonishingly quick adoption in late 
1997 of the Anti-Landmines Convention, which 
has already gained the 40 ratifications necessary 
for it to come into force, reveals a determination 
in the international community (though not all 
Governments feel equally strongly) to outlaw 
these weapons. New initiatives on small arms 
trafficking are underway, which could strike 
even closer to the heart of sovereignty given the 
sanctity with which the right to bear arms is 
held in some countries.49 And in reacting to the 
Secretary-General's report on Africa, the 
Security Council adopted a resolution designed 
to stem what it called "the destabilizing effect of 
illicit arms flows, in particular small armsll.50 
UN operations and the evolving nor-
mative climate 
UN Charter-based principles, values and poli-
cies-elaborated over the years in treaties, 
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resolutions, declarations, judicial opinions and 
state practice-have found their way repeatedly 
into peace agreements and the resulting peace-
keeping and peacebuilding operations. This was 
not coincidental. Sovereignty-based objections 
to outside interference, while still potent, are 
less prevalent. Few Governments today, for 
example, would argue that massive and system-
atic human rights abuses (which could lead to 
conflict) are a purely internal matter. If accused 
of such violations, they are more likely to stake 
a claim of innocence on the facts rather than the 
non-existence of relevant law (they would say 
"we didn't do it" rather than "it's none of your 
business"). 
The balance of power on the ground and the 
pursuit of maximum advantage are the key 
determinants of any peace negotiations, but the 
normative climate provides a framework in 
which the negotiations take place-generating 
expectations and conceptions which are shared 
by actors who inhabit the same normative 
world. The process of course is not simply a 
matter of the parties agreeing on certain norms 
and arranging their relationship accordingly. It is 
much more dynamic and complex. Arguments 
that are consistent with global normative 
standards are more likely to find favour in the 
international community and are more likely to 
win support for the party that makes them. 
Conversely, if credibility in the international 
community matters to a party, it will make 
concessions to that community's normative 
standards-as long as its vital interests are not 
fatally compromised. Thus, in El Salvador, the 
Government ultimately agreed to the extensive 
human rights aspects of the peace accords in 
part because its international credibility 
depended on it. 
This evolving normative climate, it should be 
added, has influenced not only peacekeeping and 
peace building missions, but the entire range of 
UN operational activities. The Secretary-
General's initiatives in Algeria and Nigeria-at 
the invitation of the respective Governments-
are cases in point. His public involvement in the 
first began with a statement made by his 
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Spokesman on 29 August 1997 regretting the 
"horrendous" loss of life in the country, and 
calling on the people of Algeria to build a "just 
and democratic society grounded in respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms". The 
next day, he said in answer to a question at a 
press conference: 
We are dealing with a situation which for a 
long time has been treated as an internal affair, 
and yet as the killing goes on and the numbers 
of victims rise, it is extremely difficult for all of 
us to pretend that it is not happening, that we 
do not know about it and that We should leave 
the Algerian population to their lot. I think that 
as compassionate human beings, as people with 
conscience and moral concerns, I think we are 
all moved and concerned by what is happening 
in Algeria. Words may not be enough but it is a 
beginning to let the victims know that third 
parties care and sometimes it gives them 
courage [ . .} I hope we can find ways and 
means of encouraging the parties to cease the 
violence. 
What followed was a dialogue with the 
Govemment that led to an invitation to a Panel 
of Eminent Persons established by the 
Secretary-General to visit the country, in order 
to "gather information on the situation in Algeria 
and present a report to him which he will make 
public". The Panel went to the country in late 
July, its report was delivered to the Govemment 
on 14 September and it was made public on 16 
September. 
In Nigeria, the Secretary-General's 
involvement in that country's transition to 
democracy dated to his early contacts with the 
Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, 
successor to General Abacha. At the invitation 
of General Abubakar, the Secretary-General 
visited the country in early July where he met 
among others Chief Abiola, the imprisoned 
putative winner of the 1992 elections, who died 
tragically only a few days after the Secretary-
General left. The Nigerian Govemment 
subsequently announced its programme for the 
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transition to democracy and Presidential 
elections won by Olusegun Obasanjo took place 
in February 1999, with the handover to civilian 
rule scheduled to be completed by May. Mean-
while, on 18 September 1998, the Government 
agreed for the first time to a visit in November 
by the Special Rapporteur on Nigeria appointed 
by the Human Rights Commission. 
Initiatives such as these, in the words of a 
UN official writing in the pages of a UN 
publication, represent virtually unprecedented 
involvement in the innermost political workings 
of a Member State: 
[They] have pushed the limits to which the UN 
has traditionally hewed in offering multilateral 
diplomacy as a channel which simultaneously 
addresses a country s internal difficulties and its 
frayed international ties. These efforts can yield 
enormous dividends for peace, but while always 
carefully calibrated with key UN actors, they 
carry considerable risks for Mr. Annan S 
personal standing. 5/ 
It is too early to judge the long-term impact of 
the Secretary-General's initiatives in these 
cases, but it can safely be said that neither of 
them would have been possible in a different 
normative climate. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that while 
UN operational activities are affected by the 
normative climate, they also give content to the 
prevailing norms and, case-by-case, push the 
normative boundaries. Because certain standards 
and rules are common to many peace 
operations, a body of practice surrounding them 
has developed and their status as global norms 
has been reinforced. 52 The most obvious 
example is the rules of engagement of 
peacekeeping, technical assistance, humanitarian 
and other kinds of missions, which constitute a 
body of internal law that tends to reach beyond 
the specific operations to which they apply. In a 
sense every operation established pursuant to a 
resolution of a UN organ is an application and 
interpretation of the UN Charter and other 
relevant law. 53 Either through a rational 
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application oflessons learned, or the inertial 
force of precedent, what seems to work in one 
operation will often be tried in the next. As a 
result, demonstrably successful cases of inter-
national intervention (or at least interventions 
that do not manifestly fail) reinforce inchoate 
norms. 
Conclusion 
The UN is, among other things, a forum where 
states meet to forge and give expression to 
values that govern attitudes and expectations 
about the requirements of peace. It is also a 
place where those values are put to the test in 
practical operations. The changing normative 
climate has affected UN efforts to manage 
transitions from war to peace, opening up new 
opportunities-and creating substantial risks. 
The UN simply does not have the capacity to 
respond effectively to every demand for its 
services, and moreover those demands are not 
always based on a genuine desire for peace. 
Drawing the UN into a conflict is often used by 
one or the other party to relieve less welcome 
pressure from other sources. The Organization 
must be careful not to allow its involvement to 
be used as a screen behind which parties hide or 
as an opportunity to play international efforts 
off against each other. Nor can it be used as an 
excuse for inaction by other external actors who 
may be better placed to make a difference. 
Thus the UN must be strategic in choosing 
when it becomes involved in a conflict-an 
invitation from the parties in itself is not 
enough-and when it does become involved, it 
must necessarily do so proactively. Even a 
comprehensive peace agreement is only a road 
map; judgement must continually be exercised in 
travelling the road mapped out. Reconciling the 
demands of peace and justice, for example, is as 
much a challenge for implementation of these 
agreements as it is for their negotiation. The 
timing of elections in relation to other aspects of 
a peace process (such as disarmament) can 
make the difference between a return to war and 
peace, as transitions to democratic governance 
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can in the short term be divisive. Post-conflict 
reconstruction and economic rehabilitation 
require a balance between the long-term needs 
of development and the short to medium term 
demands of shoring up a fragile peace process. 
The UN and international community must judge 
when its peace building work is done-when it 
can safely withdraw and resume normal 
development and assistance activities without 
risk of the country sliding back into war." 
Conversely, how to react when a peace 
agreement goes wrong is a major normative 
challenge for the UN. Can it withdraw in good 
conscience, leaving the country to its fate, or 
does it have an obligation to see the process 
through, shifting into a Chapter VII mode if 
necessary? 
Sometimes the UN must be " more royalist 
than the king", insisting on compliance more 
strenuously than the parties themselves, because 
in transformative peace processes, the parties 
narrowly defined are not the only ones with a 
stake in the process. If the UN is going to take 
the risky step of "second-guessing" the local 
actors, it must be guided by principle and not 
expedience. Moreover, recent experiences in 
Somalia, Bosnia, R wanda and elsewhere have 
demonstrated that performance in the field does 
not always match the ideals of the UN Charter. 
The UN-the Security Council, the Secretariat 
and field missions-will be held accountable (in 
the court of international public opinion, if 
nowhere else) for their acts and omissions. 
Ultimately, lasting peace cannot be imposed 
even when coercive intervention may be 
justified. Authentic reconciliation must come 
from within. The UN can play a role in these 
transitions, not by supplanting the sovereign 
actors but by encouraging moderate indigenous 
forces and helping to build institutions and shape 
attitudes necessary for self-sustaining peace. 
From time to time, this may require active 
involvement in sovereign processes. That these 
consent-based operations do often touch on the 
core of sovereignty is a measure of the growing 
consensus on the basic norms that govern global 
interdependence. By situating its efforts in the 
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increasingly firm bed of international law, the 
UN is more likely to gain local agreement to its 
involvement and better able to sustain the 
commitment of the international community to 
peacebuilding until the work of consolidating 
peace is done. 
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